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BOOK REVIEW
JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW. By Julio C.

Cueto-Rua. Baton Rouge, The Publications Institute, Paul M. Hebert
Law Center, Louisiana State Unviersity, 508 pp., 1981.
Shael Herman*
As lawyers and law students routinely point out, law school is
an inhospitable place to philosophize about justice.' In American law
schools, the term "axiology," the branch of philosophy that deals
systematically with values, is virtually unknown. Of course, an occasional social theory course concerns the interplay of social values;
and jurisprudence courses, if their orientation is not unduly positivistic, discuss what is just. For most students and teachers, however,
law school implies professional training; the average student, seeking mastery of the intricacies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as initiation into the mysteries of the Civil Code, the
Uniform Commercial Code, and the Internal Revenue Code, quickly
discounts the benefits of theorizing about justice. Law practice requires him to know what the law is, not to speculate about what it
might be. Fortified by a steady diet of Socratic dialogues, cases and
hornbooks, he trains to do battle with his eventual adversaries, apparently on the implicit assumption that whatever results from the
adversary system is just. If, as Sir Henry Maine claimed, "substantive law is gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure,"' then
in law school, notions of justice and value are gradually secreted in
the interstices of technicality. The essential point of Dr. Julio CuetoRua's new volume, Judicial Methods of Interpretationof the Law, is
that judicial method in both civil and common law secretes issues of
philosophy and value as naturally as bees make honey.
Professor Cueto-Rua's book is an inquiry into the anatomy of
Member. Louisiana Bar Association.
1. There are exceptions to this statement like any other. See, for example, the
symposium on legal scholarship in 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981). But such philosophizing is
exceptional even in exceptional schools because the' basic curriculum is for the practicing lawyer, a career that law professors have consciously rejected. The tension between the goals of teachers and students is well discussed in Kronman, Forward..
Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J."955 (1981).
2.

H. MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883), quoted in Maitland, The Forms

of Action at Common Law in EQUITY 295 (1909). Like so many other quotations, this
one has been rubbed smooth with time. The full quotation is: "So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of the Courts of Justice that substantive
law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure."
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hard cases; it makes us conscious of the variety of techniques for
judicial decision making when there are no clear solutions. This is
not to imply that lawyers never think about hard cases. Sometimes
we do, but we do not do so systematically or consciously. We may
puzzle over a hard case, and if it supports our position, we cite it; if
it is against us, we distinguish it. But we generally do not ask why
the judge thought as he did and what his range of choices included.
For this attitude there are several explanations. First, we live in an
intensely pragmatic society concerned more with the marketability
of ideas than with their consistency and aesthetic appeal. Legal
training orients us towards achieving results rather than meditating
upon ultimate values. Second, a type of legal realism bordering upon
nihilism has made it increasingly easy for us to say that rational explanations for judicial decisions do not necessarily exist. (This view
is capsulized in the familiar refrain, "To understand the decision,
find out what the judge had for breakfast.") According to a more
moderate version of this realist attitude, it is futile to attempt to rationalize decisions delivered by judges who attended different law
schools, lived at different times, and came from diverse social
strata.' Quot judices tot sententiae.
Try as we might to do otherwise, the daily demands of practice
usually keep us from attaining higher status than that of workers in
the vineyard. By contrast, Professor Cueto-Rua is a botanist, for he
scientifically sifts through seemingly disparate legal decisions, deftly
sorts them into units susceptible of examination, classifies them, and
demonstrates their inner workings. He also collects a number of interesting specimen opinions in the second half of the book. He
clarifies issues of axiology that we as lawyers see through a glass
darkly if we see them at all. As John Dixon, Jr., Chief Justice of
the Louisiana Supreme Court, reports in the preface of the book,
even the judges themselves might miss the axiological issues embedded in their decisions: Their "efforts to balance the legitimate inter-

3. For some scholars, the futility of rationalizing decisions has its own ideological
implications because the process of rationalization constitutes suppression of contradiction. According to Morton Horwitz,
[h]istory came to be subversi[on] [when] ...the analytic tradition committed itself
to the suppression of contradiction-to the basic attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable by showing that X and-not X can exist at the same time, which is essential
to demonstrating that an unjust social order is capable of being rational.
Horwitz, The Historical Contingency of the Role of History, 90 YALE L.J. 1057, 1058
(1981).
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ests of society are usually crude, elemental and narrow because axiology

. . .

is foreign" to them.'

This work, the by-product of a series of seminars for Louisiana's
appellate judges, proceeds on the view that "[plrofessionally trained
judges in both civil law and common law countries appear to apply
methods of interpretation of law which follow the same basic pattern."' Though no one seriously maintains that judges, under either
civil law or common law, are only what they eat or that their
judgments are merely the rules they embody, explaining exactly
what they do is a challenge. As the author acknowledges, his work
deviates from the "prevailing approach" in studies of judicial
method which focuses "attention on the general rules of law as
though the question of interpretation was concerned exclusively
with the discovery and statement of the meaning of . . . general

rules."' This last comment indicates the author's intellectual debt to
Holmes' and Jhering's commonly held view, later popularized by the
legal realists, that legal rules could not be understood in isolation
from daily reality. Thus, the author seeks to avoid the errors committed by Jhering's Bergriffsjurist,8 a caricature of the German
Pandectists, by starting his investigation into judicial interpretation
where the judge starts-in the concrete facts of the case. In reality,
Cueto-Rua argues, judicial interpretation involves more than manipulation of heavenly concepts; it implicates a dialectical process
whereby the judge alternates between facts and law in an effort to
achieve a rapprochement between them.' For Cueto-Rua, as for
philosophers since Plato, dialectical reasoning is a mode of interpreting reality whereby the human mind gains successive views of
being and seeks to interrelate them. Once the views are connected,
reality appears to us as a motion picture though we are also aware
that individual and successive glimpses of reality are like static
4.

J. CUETO-RUA, JUDICIAL METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW at X (preface

by Dixon, C.J.).
5.
6.

Id. at 1.
ld. at 2.

7.

According to Holmes, "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been ex-

perience." THE COMMON LAW.1 (1881). Jhering's locution was strikingly similar: "Life is

not here to serve concepts, concepts are here to serve life. What will come to pass is
not postulated by logic but by life," quoted in Zweigert & Siehr, Jhering'a Influence on
Development of the Comparative Method, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 215 (1971). [hereinafter
cited as Jhering'8 Influence].

8. On Jhering's reaction to the arid conceptualism of the Pandektenschule, see
Jhering's Influence, supra note 7, at 216-17 and citations therein.
9. J. CUETO-RUA, supra note 4, at 4.
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frames or snapshots. As the great Spanish philosopher Ortega y
Gasset noted, dialectical reasoning is a fundamental way of learning.
"Knowledge in its ultimate and radical concretion is dialectics .... ,
Dialectical reasoning presupposes a radical discontinuity of
value and fact, of the human intellect and the empirical universe
outside the intellect. As Ortega noted, "philosophy begins by bisecting a seemingly single world ... leaving us with two worlds on our
hands." 1 Dialectical reasoning is closely allied to legal reasoning, for
the judge mediates between the physical world outside the mind
and the values that appear as categories of the mind. He grasps the
facts of the case and squares them with legal concepts as well as
ethical precepts he already knows. This squaring of concepts and
facts is no idle pastime. Because the legal labels he assigns to facts
dictate consequences for the litigants and eventually for the whole
society, a judge must shift back and forth many times to assure his
full grasp of the dispute. His eventual decision is normative in the
sense that it links facts to legal consequences by means of the
logical copula "ought." For example, because X harmed Y, he is
liable to Y and ought to repair the damage. The values discovered
by the judge in the facts of a dispute dictate his determination of
liability.
For the scheme of values he employs in this book, Professor
Cueto-Rua is indebted to the Argentine legal philosopher, Carlos
Cossio. Occurring in interdependent pairs; Cossio's hierarchy of
values consists of solidarity and isolation, cooperation and uncooperativeness, peace and discord, power and anarchy, sequrity and insecurity, and order and disorder. According to Cossio, these values
have various degrees of axiological dignity or priority. Peace, solidarity, and security outrank power, cooperation, and order. According to Professor Cueto-Rua, disputes related to acquisitive and
liberative prescription usually involve questions of order because
members of the community must know when tensions will end and
relationships will stabilize. Likewise, cases dealing with the rights of
bona fide purchasers raise questions of party security because no
market can operate without an assurance of security, for honest
buyers. Cases on vicinage involve communal solidarity. In most
cases, several values in the axiological heirarchy are at stake.
Cases concerning whether . . . a contract is invalid because of
10.

J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHY 44 (T. Talbot trans. 1945).

[hereinafter cited as ORIGINI.
11.

ORIGIN, supra note 10, at 67.
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one party's false representations about the value of the object
will present issues involving security of transactions as well as
cooperation and peace.... [C]ases treating the donation of blood,
skin or human organs may put both security and .[sociall solidarity in issue.2
Earlier we noted that dialectical reasoning is characterized by a
radical discontinuity-a seemingly unbridgeable gap - between the
facts of the case and the values the judgefinds in them. The application of Cossio's axiological hierarchy underscores the judge's task of
bridging the gap between fact and value and our corresponding concern with finding criteria by which' to evaluate his approach. To put
a political point on the question, if the judge is the human face of
the state, what guarantees 'that he does not find facts and apply law
as he pleases? If, as Cueto-Rua argues, the judge in every case must
choose a single'right solution, what assures that he will not choose a
solution in the same way he chooses breakfast?
According to the author, the judge is bound to follow objective
guidelines. In a given case, some facts are declared relevant by
legislation, others by judicial. precedent, and still *others by
customary rules. Thus, if a line of decisions, or a statute, sets a time
limit for a particular action regardless of the plaintiff's age, it is
pointless for the judge to find that the party seeking to avoid the effect of the limitation is a minor. Sometimes, however, a case is so
exceptional that neither precedent nor statutory law address it. In
other. words, a gap in the law exists because either history does not
repeat itself or the legislator is fallible. In case of a gap,'if the judge
tries to ignore an unprovided for fact, he will distort the'case; if he
tries to distort it,. he becomes conscious of being unfair. Thus,
argues the author, the judge, in order to maintain his equilibrium,
may seek guidance'in monographs and doctrinal works" that may
have advanced a daring hypothesis in anticipation of the peculiar
facts he confronts.. He may employ the plain meaning doctrine," investigate the historical context of the disputed legislation," or apply
a pragmatic, result-oriented analysis" compelled. by' the competition
of axiological factors. 7
To some readers, Professor Cueto-Rua's description of judicial
method in a hard case may seem too sanguine. Certainly his descrip12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

J. CUETO-RUA, supra note 4, at 245.
Id. at 192-204.
Id. at 96-102.
rd. at 146-75.
Id. at 176-91.'
Id. at 205-72.
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tion of judicial method does not account for the apparently arbitrary
judicial behavior characteristic of a number of countries today. Even
in the United States, though Cueto-Rua's account may explain how a
judge could decide a case, it does not explain how he actually
decides the case. To demonstrate the nature of this actual decision
making process, the second half of the book presents thirty-three
decisions selected from the jurisprudence of Louisiana courts as well
as other state and federal courts throughout the United States.
Each of these cases is "hard" in the sense that the judge found no
ready answer in prior cases or legislation, and sharp competition
among values and policies existed. The author prefaces each case
with an explanation of its background and the values in conflict. He
also links particular methodological problems presented in the first
half of the book to illustrative cases reproduced in the second half.
Thus, the discussion of Wurzel's doctrine of projection of concepts
5
upon unforeseen phenomena"5 refers us to Prudhomme v. Savant,"
in which the Louisiana Supreme Court decided if a typewritten nuncupative will was valid although the applicable Civil Code rule,
enacted long before the invention of typewriters, required the notary
to write the will in his own hand. When the author discusses the influence of custom on judicial decisions," he reproduces a United
States Supreme Court case that construes the meaning of "immoral
practice" in the Mann Act."' His discussion of the plain meaning doctrine" guides us to a tax case concerning whether a gift in trust was
"transferred" under applicable regulations though the settlor retained broad powers to revoke or modify the trust." Analyzing interpretation by reference' and the problems arising when two or more
sets of rules could logically settle a dispute, the author refers his
readers to Wilkinson v. Wilkinson." In this case, the Louisiana
Supreme Court had to decide which of two apparently conflicting
rules applied to a prenuptial marriage contract made by a 16 year
old minor assisted by her mother but not her father. In the'syllabus
of issues after this case, the author points out that the court had to
account for two compelling "public policies": first, the social value of
upholding the validity of a marriage to assure a child's legitimacy
18. Id. at 39-40.
19. 150 La. 256, 90 So. 640 (1922).
20. J. CUETO-RUA, supra note 4, at 87.
21. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916).
22. J. CUETO-RUA, supra note 4, at 101.
23. Commissioner.v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1932).
24. J. CUETO-RUA, supra note 4, at 114.
25. 312 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975), revd, 328 So. 2d 69 (La. 1976).
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and second, the social value of protecting minors in their contractual
arrangements."
Drawn from a broad variety of substantive topics, these decisions are highly instructive. Though they bring the -reader closer to
an understanding of how some particularly fascinating cases were
decided, they inevitably fall short of showing us how judges actually
decide cases. According to Justice Dixon's recent lecture to the
Louisiana Bar, decision making is a more agonizing process than
Professor Cueto-Rua allows, and he "has never consciously followed
Cueto-Rua's method in deciding a case.""1 Justice Dixon authored the
opinion in Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, and he did not make clear what
factors impelled him to its result. Even if his reasons in Wilkinson
were clarified, the reader might doubt whether any explanation of
judicial methodology would render transparent the decisional process in an even harder case such as Roe v. Wade," where the competing policies were incommensurable.
I do not want to be misunderstood as criticizing the author's explanation of judicial method. Instead I am expressing a widelyshared doubt that anyone-including the judges-can explain how
cases are decided. In this iconoclastic era, we tend to be stubbornly
skeptical about anyone's ability to give a full, rational account of any
human experience, whether it is politics, economics, or physics. Faced
with flawed explanations of judicial method, we symphatize with the
frustrated speaker in Auden's "Law Like Love," who, after'rejecting
the guidance of his elders, his children, the church, and the
academy, turns to an equally frustrated judge:
Law, says the judge as he looks down his nose,
Speaking clearly and most severely,
Law is as I've told you before,
Law is as you know I suppose,
Law is but let me explain it once more,
Law is The Law."
A book review is not the place to detail the historical background of
this skepticism. The erosion of traditional authority that led Auden's
judge into solipsism also encourages us to distrust at least slightly
26. J.
27.

CUETO-RUA,

supra note 4. at 388.

John Dixon, Judicial Method in Interpretation of the Law in Louisiana, p. 30.

(speech delivered at the Royal Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence, Madrid,
Spain. Oct. 27. 1981) (on file with reviewer).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

29. Auden, Law Like Love, in SELECTED

POETRY OF

W.H. AUDEN 63 (2d ed. 1971).
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anyone claiming to explain complex psychological phenomena that
dictate human behavior. Today the choice of legal and social values,
like preferences in clothes, food, and lifesyle, is often defended with
the maxim de gustibus non disputandum est. According to a commonly held view, embodied in Ortega y Gasset's image of the bisected world, reality outside the human mind is objective and values
are subjective. Even this idea is further complicated by the fact that
no one perceives any reality except by means of the mind. The
radical discontinuity of fact and value implies that every human
psyche is awash in solipsism, and hence that there are no legitimate
criteria for evaluating assertions of value. The author himself, even
as he proclaims the application of Cossio's hierarchy of values, is
aware of these doubts, and clues to his awareness appear throughout his book. At several points, for example, he discusses the inherent vagueness and ambiguity of common words in natural languages including the language of law. Like the British philosopher,
H.L.A. Hart, Cueto-Rua subscribes to the view that common words
have clear essential or core meanings and uncertain halos or penumbras." The author points out that the word "immovable," for example, has at least the following meanings:
1) incapable of being moved
2) not moving or not intended to be moved'
3) steadfast, unyielding
4) real property8
Then he demonstrates the difficulty in pinning down the essential
meaning of "immovable":
There is no question that land is an immovable, as is a building
built on the land. But, what about a mobile home for which the
wheels have been removed and which is fixed to the ground by
short steel posts? What about wooden partitions in a house
which are nailed to the walls and screwed to the floor? What
about the central heating system installed in a building?"

30.

Hart has amplified the idea of core meanings and penumbras in H. HART, THE

CONCEPT OF LAW 119-50 (1961) and in Hart, Jhering's Heaven of Concepts and Modern
Analyical Jurisprudencein JHERING's ERBE: GOTTINGER SYMPOSIUM ZUR 150. WIFDERKEHER
DES BEBURTSTAGS VON RUDOLPH VON JHERING 76 (F. Wieacher & E. Wollschlager, eds.

1970). Students of constitutional law will recognize Hart's theory as the probable inspiration for Justice Douglas' discussion of penumbras of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479-86 (1965).
31. J. CUETO-RUA, supra note 4, at 97.
32. ld.
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Even if a statutory term is clear on the day of its enactment, it can
be distorted to account for new situations-Thus, he asks, can there
be a robbery of radiation or a warranty of fitness for transplanted
organs?" If words in a statute tend to become spongy and porous
over time, then inevitably the criteria employed to evaluate the application of these words, because they too come from natural language, lose their stability. To use one of the values from CuetoRua's hierarchy, does any clear and widely accepted meaning of "solidarity" spring to mind except for the technical one associated with
liability of co-obligors in solido? Is there a consensus on the definition of justice? The author himself suggests at least ten such meanings. Having pointed out the inherent problems in rationally accounting for how judges render justice, I do not mean to give the impression that one should not try to give such an account. It is infinitely
better to try than to slide into a slough of despondency declaring
that if no account can be perfect, no account at all should be attempted. Human beings are rational animals; we would be less than rational if we stopped trying to understand such important aspects of
human experience. Plato and Aristotle understood this point. CuetoRua's study is valuable for many reasons. For lawyers, it is a powerful antidote to the pragmatism and hypertechnicality of daily practice. For students, it can counteract the typical tendency to read
cases as if they were only rules, devoid of philosophical implications.
Even when this book does not answer all our questions, it will certainly stimulate dialogue about a politically charged activity, which,
if unchecked, could lead to tyranny. Socrates never achieved more.

33.

Id at 101.

